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n 2013, Edward Snowden revealed to the public that the U.S. 
National Security Agency (NSA) was operating a massive, 
secret, cybersurveillance operation1, thereby touching off a 
national debate regarding the permissibility and desirability of the 
NSA program2. In the ensuing years, both Congress and the 
American public debated fundamental issues regarding the 
relationship between the citizen and the government. Entwined up 
in these debates were issues relating to national security, especially 
the need to detect and apprehend potential terrorists, against the 
citizenry’s interest in privacy against governmental surveillance and 
intrusion3. 
Now that five years have passed since the Snowden disclosures, it 
is appropriate to reflect on how these societal debates have played 
out. In the interim, much has happened. In addition to the 
congressional and societal debates regarding whether government 
should be conducting such an operation, there have been efforts 
to litigate regarding the permissibility of that program. Further, the 
U.S. Congress has voted twice on the extent to which 
governmental cyber-surveillance should be allowed to continue4. 
This article analyzes how Congress and the American people have 
responded to the Snowden revelations. 
                                               
1 See S. SHANE, “No Morsel Too Minuscule for All-Consuming NSA: From Spying on 
Leader of U.N. to tracking Drug Deals, on Ethos of ‘Why Not?’”, The New York Times, 
A10 (Nov. 13, 2013); D. STANGLIN; “Snowden Says NSA Can Tap Email Chats”, The 
Courier-Journal, A3 (Aug. 1, 2013). 
2 See J. MARKOFF, “The Snowden Effect: 2 Pioneers Debate the Future of the Net”, The 
Washington Post 14 (Jan. 2, 2014) (“Edward Snowden’s actions have raised a new storm of 
controversy about the role of the Internet.”); J. CALMES & N. WINGFIELD, “Visions 
Collide as Silicon Valley Leaders Go to White House: Tech Firms Want NSA”, 
International New York Times 17 (Dec. 19, 2013); J. RISEN, “Microsoft”, International Herald 
Tribune 5 (July 13, 2013). 
3 Id.; see also United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (ordering President Nixon to release 
information, but noting that confidentiality regarding the President’s conversations and 
correspondence is generally privileged, and going on to note that this privilege is 
“fundamental to the operation of Government and inextricably rooted in the separation 
of powers under the Constitution.”). 
4 See SCHNEIER, supra note ____. 
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§ 1 – CYBER-SURVEILLANCE AT THE TIME OF THE SNOWDEN 
REVELATIONS 
The program that Snowden revealed was massive. At the time, the 
NSA had a budget in excess of $10 billion per year5, as well as 
35,000 employees6, and it was systematically collecting and storing 
huge amounts of data7. Among the data that it was collecting were 
cell phone call records, e-mails, text messages, credit card purchase 
records and information derived from social media networks8. In 
total, the NSA had intercepted some 182 million communication 
records9. The overwhelming majority of this cyber-surveillance was 
being conducted in secret, and the American public was previously 
unaware of the nature or scope of the NSA’s activities. 
Even though the NSA’s surveillance operation was primarily 
focused on foreign intelligence targets, it inevitably swept up large 
numbers of records involving Americans10. The NSA claimed that 
it operation was focus on communications with “foreign 
intelligence value”11 and on foreign intelligence targets12. Indeed, as 
President Obama boldly proclaimed, “Nobody is listening to your 
telephone calls.”13 However, Obama admitted that, when 
Americans communicate with foreigners, the NSA may be able to 
target their communications14. Since there were literally billions of 
communications between U.S. citizens and foreigners per day, 
Obama’s reassurance provided little consolation to the American 
public. 
The other major problem was that the NSA was collecting and 
storing large quantities of electronic information. In the process, 
the NSA was deceiving the public by publicly stating that it was not 
collecting data except under limited circumstances: when it 
believed that the recording or transcript contained “foreign 
intelligence information,” evidence of a possible crime, a “threat of 
serious harm to life or property,” or that shed “light on technical 
issues like encryption or vulnerability to cyber attacks.”15 The 
reality was quite different. Taking advantage of the digital capacity 
to easily store large quantities of information, the NSA had 
established a data storage center which allowed it to collect, store 
                                               
5 See id. 
6 See id. 
7 See M. MENDOZA, “Reagan’s Order Led to NSA’s Broader Spying”, The Courier-Journal, 
A10, c. 1-6 (Nov. 24, 2013).  
8 See id.; see also P. MAASS, “How Laura Poitras Helped Snowden Spill His Secrets”, The 
New York Times, § MM (Aug. 13, 2013); Ch. SAVAGE, “C.I.A. Ties to AT&T’s Add 
Another Side to Spy Debate”, International Herald Tribune, A5 (Nov. 8, 2013). 
9 See M. MENDOZA, “Reagan’s Order Led to NSA’s Broader Spying”, The Courier-Journal, 
A10, c. 1-6 (Nov. 24, 2013). 
10 See P. SEMANSKY, “NSA Ends Sept. 11-Era Surveillance Program”, The Two Way, 
National Public Radio (Nov. 29, 2015). 
11 See S. SHANE, “Documents Detail Restrictions on N.S.A. Surveillance”, The New York 
Times A9 (June 21, 2014); see also MENDOZA, supra note 8. 
12 See SHANE, supra note 9. 
13 See id. 
14 See K. JOHNSON, “NSA: Surveillance Foiled 50 Terrorist Plots; Director Says NYSE 
Was Among Targets”, USA Today, 5A (June 20, 2013). 
15 Id. 
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and search huge quantities of information16, and allowed it to 
routinely collect extraordinarily large amounts of information 
regarding virtually everyone17. 
The NSA’s governing legal structure is the Foreign Intelligence 
Security Act of 1978 (FISA)18, which was originally conceived of as 
a way to respond to “foreign powers” or “agents of foreign 
powers” who are suspected of engaging in espionage or terrorism19. 
The term “foreign powers” was defined to focus on “groups” 
engaged in international terrorism20. However, the concept was 
later expanded to include so-called “lone wolfs” – a person who is 
engaging in or preparing for terrorist acts who does not have a 
connection to a foreign government or a terrorist group21.  
The Protect America Act of 2007 provided that communications 
that begin or end in a foreign country can be wiretapped without 
FISA supervision22. FISA also created the Federal Intelligence 
Surveillance Court (FICSC), and authorized it to issue surveillance 
warrants against foreign intelligence agents working inside the U.S. 
Warrants are issued ex parte, in secret, without adversarial 
proceedings, and the records of the proceedings are withheld from 
the public. 
It is not clear how rigorously the FISC reviewed warrant 
applications. Over the years, FISC has issued tens of thousands of 
FISA warrants, and only denied a handful of requests. Those 
denials were appealable to the United States Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court of Review, which also functioned in secret, but 
there have been few appeals23.  
Under pre-existing law, the NSA was allowed to eavesdrop on 
communications cables outside the U.S., as well as 
communications cables between foreign countries that passed 
through the U.S.24. FISA, Section 702, expanded the NSA’s 
authority by allowing the NSA to tap cables passing through the 
U.S., and by giving it the right to collect data directly from internet 
companies through a program called PRISM25. Although these 
programs were focused on collecting data regarding non-
Americans, communications by Americans were inevitably swept 
up in the process26.  
                                               
16 See S. SHANE & D. E. SANGER, “Job Title Key to Inner Access Held by Leaker”, The 
New York Times A1 (July 1, 2013). 
17 See Shane, supra note 9. 
18 50 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq.  
19 Id. 
20 Id. at § 1801(a) (4) & (5).  
21 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(1)(C). 
22 Pub. L. 110-55. 
23 50 U.S.C. § 105(a)(3) & (b).  
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
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§ 2 – POST-SNOWDEN ALTERATIONS TO THE U.S. 
CYBERSURVEILLANCE PROGRAM 
Post-Snowden, have there been significant changes in the way that 
the NSA has functioned? While there have been changes, the 
alterations are perhaps not as dramatic as one might have 
anticipated. In the aftermath, Section 702 of FISA has not only 
survived, but was re-enacted during the Obama administration and 
the Trump administration27. The most recent re-enactment 
occurred in January, 201828. Although these re-enactments were 
opposed by privacy advocates, and championed by national 
security hawks, the Trump era re-enactment passed easily (65 - 34 
in the U.S. Senate)29. Privacy advocates did succeed in imposing 
certain limitations, but failed in their efforts to promote other 
limitations30. 
The re-enactments limited NSA’s cybersurveillance authority in 
important respects. For one thing, Congress limited the NSA’s 
authority to engage in the bulk collection of metadata from 
Americans’ phone calls31. Under the program, as it existed before 
the Snowden revelations, large telecom companies were required 
to hand over “metadata” (e.g., information regarding phone 
numbers and the duration of calls) to the NSA, but were not 
required to turn over the content of phone conversations. 
Nevertheless, the NSA was bulk collecting information from 
providers such as Verizon32. And, of course, the worry was that the 
NSA might indiscriminately search through the bulk collection. 
Although the 2015 law allowed the NSA to continue accessing 
metadata33, the law provided that the data would remain with the 
telecom service providers rather than being collected and stored by 
the NSA34. In order to gain access to such information, the NSA 
was required to seek a court order giving it access to specific 
records35. 
The NSA was also authorized to engage in surveillance regarding 
so-called “upstream” collections of information from 
telecommunications companies like AT&T and Verizon36. In other 
words, the NSA collected emails and texts that crossed U.S. 
borders, including messages that mentioned identifying terms (e.g., 
email addresses) related to “foreigners who the agency was spying 
on even though the messages were not to or from those targets.”37 
                                               
27 See SCHNEIER, supra note ____. 
28 Id. 
29 See K. DEMIRJIAN, “Senate Passes Bill to Extend Key Surveillance Program, Sending It 
to Trumps Desk”, The Washington Post (Jan. 18, 2018). 
30 See House Votes to Renew Surveillance Law, Rejects Privacy Limits; Intelligence Agencies, Trump 
Scores a Victory, Boston Globe A (Jan. 12, 2018). 
31 See P. SEMANSKY, “NSA Ends Sept. 11-Era Surveillance Program”, The Two Way, 
National Public Radio (Nov. 29, 2015). 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Ch. SAVAGE, “N.S.A. Halts Collection of Americans’ Emails About Foreign Targets”, 
New York Times (Apr. 28, 2017). 
37 Id. 
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Before Snowden’s revelations, the NSA’s collection of this 
information was permitted under the FISA Amendments Act of 
2008, but was largely unknown by the American public38, and the 
government took steps to convince the courts that these upstream 
communications were permissible under the U.S. Constitution and 
statutory requirements, and that such “about” communications 
were an important tool in fighting terrorism: “Under the proposed 
method of conducting electronic surveillance, then, N.S.A. will be 
in a position not only to learn information about the activities of 
its targets, but also to discover information about new potential 
targets that it may never have otherwise acquired.”39 Of course, one 
of the problems with this “about” collection system was that it 
snagged “tens of thousands of purely domestic emails each year.”40 
Despite the firestorm of controversy raised by the Snowden 
revelations, Congress chose not to end the upstream program in its 
2015 re-authorization41. However, in 2017, the program was 
terminated in 2017 by the NSA rather than by Congress, following 
the FISA court’s conclusion that it was being conducted 
unconstitutionally42. The problem was that the collection program 
had been used to gather information about Americans when the 
NSA was not supposed to have been searching for information 
related to Americans43. Voluntarily, the NSA chose to limit its 
collection of upstream internet messages to those that are sent 
directly to or from foreign intelligence targets, forgoing collection 
of messages that simply reference those targets44.  
The 2015 amendments also did not prohibit the NSA’s so-called 
PRISM program, a so-called “downstream” method of collecting 
information sent over the internet. Under the PRISM program, the 
NSA was able to gain direct access to the servers of online 
providers such as Google, Facebook, Microsoft and Yahoo45. 
However, the PRISM system does not collect “about” 
communications46. The official said the intelligence court’s 
presiding judge, Judge Rosemary M. Collyer, has now authorized 
the agency to use Americans’ identifiers to query the newly 
captured upstream internet messages, too, for future intelligence 
investigations. Privacy advocates refer to this practice as the 
“backdoor search loophole” and want Congress to require the 
government to obtain a warrant to search for Americans’ 
incidentally collected information within the warrantless 
surveillance repository47. 
                                               
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. (SAVAGE) 
44 Id. 
45 See T. B. LEE, “Here’s Everything We Know About PRISM to Date, Workblog”, The 
Washington Post (June 12, 2013). 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
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The 2018 re-enactment did make one significant change regarding 
the use of surveillance data. One problem with Section 702 was 
that, although federal law enforcement agents were allowed to 
examine databases related to foreign targets, there was a risk that 
the NSA would use this information to obtain information about 
Americans who have corresponded with those foreign targets48. 
Under the re-enactment, although the NSA was allowed to 
continue viewing surveillance data related to Americans without a 
court order, provided that the data relates to counter terrorism, 
counterintelligence or counterespionage, they were not free to use 
that information in ordinary criminal cases without first obtaining 
judicial approval49. 
CONCLUSION 
The Snowden revelations touched off a fire-storm of controversy 
regarding governmental cybersurveillance operations. In the U.S., 
although the surveillance operation continues, it has been curtailed 
somewhat. The U.S. government no longer bulk collects and stores 
millions of items of information. But it’s secret surveillance 
operation, and many of its components, continue.  
Despite the changes that occurred in the post-Snowden era, 
governmental cyber-surveillance remains a significant issue. For 
example, in 2017, WikiLeaks broke another story showing that 
governmental cyber-surveillance continues50. In particular 
WikiLeaks revealed that the U.S. government has developed an 
array of mechanisms that allow it to break into “Apple and Android 
smart phones,” as well as “Windows computers, automotive 
computer systems, and even smart televisions.”51 Apparently, there 
were at least 14 flaws in Apple’s operating system for phones and 
tablets, and two dozen flaws in the Android system, and these flaws 
could leave individual phones vulnerable to being snooped on52. 
While these flaws did not enable the government to gather 
information en masse, they did enable the government to pry into 
individual phones, computers and smart televisions53. 
 
                                               
48 See DEMERJIAN, supra note ____. 
49 See id. 
50 See V. GOEL & N. WINGFIELD, “WikiLeaks Reignites Tensions Between Silicon Valley 
and Spy Agencies”, International New York Times A 10 (Mar. 7, 2017). 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
